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This paper studies the resilience of public policies that governments design for catalyzing economic development. This property
depends on the extent to which behavioral heuristics and spillover eﬀects allow policymakers to attain their original goals when
a particular policy cannot be funded as originally planned. This scenario takes place, for example, when unanticipated events
such as natural disasters or political turmoil obstruct the use of resources to advance certain policy issues, e.g., infrastructure or
labor reforms. Here, we analyze how the adaptive capacity of the policy-making process generates resilience in the face of
disruptions. In order to estimate the allocation of resources across policies, we employ a computational model that accounts for
diverse social mechanisms, for example, coevolutionary learning and network interdependencies. In our simulations, we use a
data set of 117 countries on 79 development indicators over an 11-year period. Then, we calculate a resilience score
corresponding to each development indicator via counter-factual analysis of policy disruptions. Next, we assess whether some
development strategies produce resilient/fragile policy proﬁles. Finally, by studying the relationship between policy resilience
and policy priority, we determine which issues are bottlenecks to economic development.
1. Introduction
Most economists are largely concerned with designing eﬃ-
cient policies for ﬁrms and the public sector but much less
preoccupied of why certain strategies fail when facing adverse
situations. Their focus on the optimal allocation of resources
has, on one hand, an ontological explanation since—in the
neoclassical view—governments and ﬁrms are assumed to
have the capacity to control the performance of a system or
organization [1]. On the other hand, there is an epistemolog-
ical explanation since economic theories are deductive con-
structions built on agents maximizing objective functions
that are speciﬁed in well-deﬁned problems. These features
become evident in the most well-known textbook deﬁnition
of economics, e.g., “the study of rational behaviors dealing
with multiple objectives and limited resources that can be used
for alternative purposes” [rephrasing [2]].
Unfortunately, the rational conception of economics—
where consumers, ﬁrms, and governments are centrally coor-
dinated through equilibria—does not allow for a clear under-
standing of why ﬁrms, policies, and economies fail. That is,
the study of resilience in human-made systems is not possible
without a decentralized systemic view. The concept of resil-
ience has diﬀerent connotations depending on the ﬁeld of
inquiry (e.g., physics, ecology, economics, sociology, or psy-
chology). In this paper, we use a deﬁnition that is compatible
with the problem of policy-making and development: “Resil-
ience is the [adaptive] capacity of a system, enterprise, or a
person to maintain its core purpose and integrity in the face
of dramatically changed circumstances” ([3], p. 7).
Under the lens of complexity science, explanations for
the failure of economies and their resilience come to light.
This is so because complexity builds on the idea that agents
within a system and systems themselves are interconnected;
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hence, they are not fully decomposable [4, 5]. Thus, it is
possible for a moderate perturbation on a subpopulation to
permeate throughout the system and inﬂuence its overall
performance with—sometimes—catastrophic consequences.
Complexity, however, is not only about connectivity but also
about diversity and adaptation. These properties stem from
the evolutionary nature of economic systems. With these
properties, economies are equipped to respond to adverse
events or failures of their components. On one hand, diver-
sity allows a system to generate alternative solutions to the
ones impaired by a failure. On the other, adaptation allows
agents to react by updating their objectives and strategies
when the environment changes.
In this paper, we study the resilience of transformative
public policies. A policy is transformative when it is designed
to generate a change in a speciﬁc issue in order to reach a
goal. For example, if the goal is to decrease infant mortality
by 50%, a transformative public policy is the construction
of hospitals in marginalized communities, while a nontrans-
formative one is the expenditure to maintain the current
health infrastructure. When countries attempt to reach a
large set of goals simultaneously, resilience arises from the
evolutionary nature of the process where policies are
designed and implemented. The work of [6] (hereon refer
to as CCG) provides a framework to model such process as
a behavioral game between a central authority (government)
and public functionaries (bureaucrats) on a network of policy
spillovers. For a country, the estimated “allocation proﬁ-
le”—i.e., the evolved distribution of resources across policy
issues—can be thought of as a consistent (or relatively eﬃ-
cient) package. In this political economy game, the govern-
ment tries to make the best use of its budget, while
bureaucrats may divert some of the allocated funds for a per-
sonal gain (i.e., corruption). Hence, rather than modelling
agents designing an optimal budgetary allocation, we esti-
mate the emergent allocation proﬁle.
In order to study resilience, we estimate the alternative
allocation proﬁles that emerge in the pretense of adverse
events. The intuition is that it is not always feasible to imple-
ment the allocation proﬁle estimated for an economic setting
that is free of unexpected adversities. These adversities occur
when resources initially intended for a transformative policy
have to be reassigned to a diﬀerent purpose. For instance,
improving health facilities is put on hold because ﬁghting
an epidemic outbreak consumes a large share of resources
from the ministry of health; a labor reform has to be post-
poned when the aﬀected unions sabotage its implementation;
an expansion of the highway system is cancelled because
recovering from a natural disaster requires substantial
resources for repairing damaged infrastructure.
An estimated allocation proﬁle depends on the goals of
the government. Consistent with the literature of economic
development, we assume that those targets are drawn from
exemplary countries. That is, a government determines its
goals by imitating the development indicators of a more
advanced nation. We term these adopted targets a develop-
ment mode. Resilience is measured by estimating the alloca-
tion proﬁle of a development mode when one of its public
policies is exogenously suspended, which we call a disruption.
Therefore, resilience is the capacity of the system to maintain
the evolution of socioeconomic indicators in line with a pre-
speciﬁed development mode. For a single country, the alloca-
tion proﬁles corresponding to each development mode allow
estimating the expected time of convergence to targets. Sig-
niﬁcant deviations from the expectation indicate whether a
policy is resilient or fragile. In this sense, resilience is not
the property of being able to recover the initial condition of
a system but rather its capability of continuing to fulﬁll its
goals when facing adverse circumstances.
Resilience analysis allows us to compare not only policy
issues but also allocation proﬁles. For example, a country like
Mexico may have diﬀerent options of development modes
(Canada, Singapore, France, etc.); however, some allocation
proﬁles may be more resilient than others. Therefore, asses-
sing the feasibility of a development mode is not only an
exercise about costs and beneﬁts but also of endurance to
adverse events. This analysis is signiﬁcantly enriched when
considering the priority that governments assign to speciﬁc
policy issues (i.e., the amount of resources allocated). For
instance, a policy issue that is not resilientmay hinder the pos-
sibility of reaching the targets set by the government. If such a
policy receives a low priority from the government, the out-
comes in terms of economic development may be worse than
expected. In other words, policies with poor resilience and low
priority act as bottlenecks to economic development. Identify-
ing these bottlenecks is paramount to development studies.
Ironically, due to the rational-equilibrium epistemology of
neoclassical economics, there are no adequate quantitative
tools for this purpose. Our work ﬁlls this gap and provides
a well-suited analytic tool.
The rest of the paper is structured with ﬁve more sec-
tions. In the second section, we frame our approach in the lit-
erature of policy resilience. In the third section, we present
the data used to calibrate our model. In the fourth section,
we provide an overview of the CCG model for analyzing
the policy-making process and explain how allocation pro-
ﬁles and their resilience are estimated. In the ﬁfth section,
we show the results of our estimations for three country cases
and a more detailed description of aggregate outcomes for
the entire database. Finally, in the sixth section, we discuss
the beneﬁts of complexity tools for studying resilience and
summarize our main ﬁndings.
2. On the Nature of Resilience and
Policy-Making
This paper studies the resilience of public policies that are
formulated through a process of adaptation and learning.
(It is neither about a system’s architecture nor of policy tools
that can improve the resilience of a particular system (e.g.,
ecological, environmental, transportation, regional, social,
ﬁnancial, urban, organizational, productive, and business).)
It explores the likelihood of failure in the pursuit of speciﬁc
development modes, independently of how this mode was
originally established (e.g., internal political agreements, imi-
tating successful countries, through international consensus,
or from pressures of the civil society). This is a relevant and
intriguing question since the evaluation of society’s (or
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government’s) aspirations requires to estimate the reach-
ability of alternative standards. In the related literature, this
approach falls under the umbrella of policy resilience at the
process level. This literature refers to the institutional and
procedural features of policy-making that are in place
when an unanticipated shock disrupts a socioeconomic sys-
tem [7]. In this respect, resilience should be of great con-
cern in setting a societal agenda (development modes)
and in formulating an allocation proﬁle that is coherent
with such agenda.
The policy process relates to three mechanisms. First, it
has to do with the governance of decision-making (e.g., stake-
holder participation, institutional accountability, and multi-
level and polycentric architectures). Second, it relates to the
functionaries’ capability of harnessing information for pro-
ducing workable policies (e.g., involvement of nonstate actors
with specialized expertise, a culture of evidence-based deci-
sion-making). Third, it deals with the administrative capacity
of public oﬃcials at the local (or agency) level so that policies
can be implemented rapidly and with certain degree of ﬂexi-
bility (e.g., well-designed protocols, use of transparent rules,
mechanisms for conﬂict resolution among agencies, and a
well-functioning system for the monitoring and sanctioning
of corruption).
The political economy game developed by CCG incor-
porates important aspects of this policy-making process,
emphasizing the distinction between design and implemen-
tation. For example, it speciﬁes the mechanisms for the
misuse of budgetary allocations by bureaucrats. Accord-
ingly, we employ this model to study how the disruption
of a public policy modiﬁes the distribution of resources
allocated to the remaining policies, while maintaining the
original set of goals. This is a resilience problem because the
policy-making process is able to readjust the allocation proﬁle
without losing its ability to fulﬁll the government’s agenda
(i.e., it is a dynamic property of the system). A related but dif-
ferent concept is robustness. In the literature of complexity,
robustness refers to the ability of a system to keep working
when some components fail (e.g., an edge in a network).
Sometimes, robustness occurs due to the redundancy of com-
ponents, paths, and functions [8]. Clearly, robustness is a
static property of the system since it is not intended to cap-
ture the adaptive nature of an economy (it only considers
connectivity and diversity).
In recent years, we have witnessed an explosion of quan-
titative methodologies for analyzing the resilience and
robustness of socioeconomic systems [9, 10]. However, the
literature of policy analysis at the process level is mainly qual-
itative [11–13]. Consequently, the tools and recommenda-
tions in this line of research are based solely on case studies
and on an informal treatment of complexity. In order to
develop a quantitative framework at the process level, it is
convenient to construct a calibrated model on how policies
are endogenously designed and implemented. This is pre-
cisely our approach. First, we build a computational political
economy game. Then, we perform Monte Carlo simulations
to estimate allocation proﬁles and resilience scores. Finally,
we analyze the outcomes in terms of countries, socioeco-
nomic indicators, development modes, and bottlenecks.
3. Data
The data consist of annual observations of 79 policy indica-
tors for 117 countries, covering the 2006–2016 period. Three
secondary sources are used to build this database: the Global
Competitiveness Report produced by the World Economic
Forum, the World Development Indicators, and the World
Governance Indicators, being the latter two assembled by
the World Bank. Following CCG, we normalize these indica-
tors so that the worst possible outcome takes a value of 0,
while the best value is 1 across countries and years.
We synthesize this information by grouping the 79 devel-
opment indicators in 13 commonly used pillars. To illustrate
the data structure, we pool countries into four clusters by
similarity in their development indicators (with cluster 1
being the most advanced and cluster 4 the least). We identify
the clusters of countries by applying Ward’s method with the
L2 (Euclidean) norm as the distance metric across the 79
indicators. Figure 1 shows that, in general, more advanced
nations have higher levels of development indicators. The
large gap between the clusters 1 and 2 denotes the middle-
income development trap.
3.1. Spillover Network. An important component of the CCG
model is a network of spillovers between public policies that
accounts for well-known interdependencies between policy
issues [14–16]. Empirically, this network is estimated from
partial correlations between development indicators at the
level of each country. Therefore, we estimate one network
for each country. Arguably, a network topology reﬂects the
socioeconomic conditions in a speciﬁc nation. We employ a
two-step empirical strategy developed in the estimation of
neural networks from functional magnetic resonance imag-
ing data [17, 18]. First, we apply the method of triangulated
maximally ﬁltered graphs (TMFG) [19] to estimate which
pairs of indicators have signiﬁcant relationships. Then, we
determine the edges’ directions (inferred causality) through
the likelihood-ratios method developed by [20]. The ﬁeld of
network estimation has various diﬀerent methods, without
a broad consensus on a gold standard. Each method assumes
a speciﬁc underlying model and is designed for data with cer-
tain properties. Our methodological choice is based on the
applicability of this strategy to high-dimensional time series
of short length. However, as new and better methods emerge,
we expect further improvements to our estimations.
4. Methods
We use the CCG model in order to simulate the policy-
making process through a behavioral game with two types
of agents: a central authority (government) and public ser-
vants (functionaries or bureaucrats). Firstly, the government
allocates resources to diﬀerent public policies, with the aim of
improving the indicators associated to their respective policy
issues. Secondly, functionaries in charge of implementing
these policies have incentives to divert public funds for per-
sonal gain. This game takes place on a spillover network.
These spillovers encourage free-riding and reinforce a mis-
alignment between the government’s and functionaries’
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incentives. (See [6] for a detailed interpretation of the
model’s equations and diﬀerent validation tests).
4.1. Evolution of Development Indicators. There are N policy
issues in the economy, each one with an indicator that mea-
sures its level of development. As a government invests Pi
∈ 0, 1 resources in a policy issue, its indicator grows, i.e.,
the investment accumulates. This means that, when the gov-
ernment sets a target Ti for policy issue i, indicator Ii will
reach Ti after a number of periods. Hence, the dynamics
describing the evolution of Ii are given by
Ii,t = Ii,t−1 + γ Ti − Ii,t−1 Ci,t +〠
j
Cj,tAj,i , 1
where γ captures the eﬀectiveness of policy-making in a spe-
ciﬁc country; Ci,t ∈ 0, Pi is the contribution of bureaucrat i
(see explanation in next section), and A is the adjacency
matrix of the spillovers network (a weighted directed graph).
4.2. The Learning Process of Public Servants. In a given period
t, a public servant i receives Pi,t resources from the central
authority and uses Ci,t eﬀectively in the implementation of
the public policy. Hence, Pi,t − Ci,t is the level of corruption
of i, while the level of i’s indicator gives him (or her) political
status. Then, in order to determine the impact of this contri-
bution, the bureaucrat evaluates the change in beneﬁts Fi
expressed through
Fi,t = Ii,t + Pi,t − Ci,t 1 − θi,t f R,t , 2
where θi,t is an indicator function derived from the supervi-
sion of the central authority, and f R,t is a map from the indi-
cator of rule of law to a probability. In the CCG model, a
period should not be interpreted as time, since the method
does not aim at reproducing time series. Instead, it should
be interpreted as the realization of events such as budgetary
readjustments. Hence, if it takes more periods to reach one
set of goals than another, we say that the former are more dif-
ﬁcult to attain than the latter.
We assume that the government cannot observe the
functionaries’ contributions directly, although larger diver-
sions of funds are more diﬃcult to hide. Hence, we model
government supervision as a random variable θi,t . The out-
come θi,t is 1 if the public servant in policy issue i is caught
diverting public funds and zero otherwise. Then, the proba-
bility mass function of θi at time t is
θi,t =
1 with probability f C,t
Pi,t − Ci,t
∑Nj=1 Pj,t − Cj,t
,
0 with probability 1 − f C,t
Pi,t − Ci,t
∑Nj=1 Pj,t − Cj,t
,
3
where f C,t is a function mapping the indicator of control of
corruption to a probability.
Note that f C,t captures the eﬀorts from the central
authority to detect corrupt oﬃcials. Meanwhile, f R,t reﬂects
the capability of the state to punish oﬃcials involved in these
activities. These two mechanisms describe diﬀerent con-
straints that governments face when ﬁghting corruption. To
be more speciﬁc, f R,t and f C,t take the form
f X,t =
IX,t
e1−IX,t
, 4
where X = R for the rule of law, or X = C for control of
corruption.
The contribution of functionary i is determined by
Ci,t =min Pi,t , max 0, Ci,t−1 + di,t ΔFi,t
Ci,t−1 + Ci,t−2
2 ,
5
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Figure 1: Gaps in socioeconomic indicators between development clusters in 2016. The X-axis corresponds to development indicators,
organized by development pillar. The wider the shaded area, the more development indicators within the corresponding pillar. For
countries without observations for 2016, we take the most recent one.
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where ΔFi,t is the most recent change in beneﬁts, and di,t is
the sign function
di,t = sgn ΔFi,t ⋅ ΔCi,t , 6
such that
ΔFi,t = Fi,t−1 − Fi,t−2,
ΔCi,t = Ci,t−1 − Ci,t−2
7
That is, functionaries’ contributions increase when
higher (or lower) past beneﬁts coincide with higher (or
lower) past contributions. Therefore, as time goes by,
bureaucrats learn the level of corruption that gives them
certain conﬁdence of keeping the beneﬁts derived from
their public post.
4.3. The Adaptive Behavior of the Central Authority. The gov-
ernment’s problem consists in deciding how to allocate its
limited resources to a large set of policies. Its objective is to
reduce the gap between the current indicators (Ii) and their
targets (Ti), where the latter come from a previously selected
development mode. Formally, the government’s multidi-
mensional problem is
min  〠
N
i=1
Ii,t − Ti
2 8
Resource allocations P1,t ,… , PN ,t are the control vari-
ables of the central authority. We call a speciﬁc conﬁguration
of these variables an allocation proﬁle. These packages of pol-
icies are the key endogenous variables to be simulated by the
model. The amount of resources that the government can
invest per period in a proﬁle is restricted by
〠
N
i
Pi,t ≤ B∀t, 9
where B denotes noncommitted resources of the central
authority. It is important to clarify that the resources
involved in this problem are those destined to transformative
policies, not public expenditure committed to previously
established purposes (e.g., highway maintenance, agricultural
subventions, and payment of public debt).
Each time step, the central authority determines an allo-
cation proﬁle and evaluates the gap between targets and
observed indicators. The amount of resources allocated to
policy issue i is determined by
pi,t =
qi,t
∑Nj qi,t
, 10
where qi,t is the propensity of assigning resources to policy i,
deﬁned as
qi,t = Ti − Ii,t Ki + 1 1 − θi,t f R,t , 11
where Ki is the number of outgoing connections of node i,
also known as its out-degree. Here, the out-degree captures
the centrality or importance of a policy issue for the
country. Hence, the government does not know the struc-
ture of the network but has a proxy of the relevance of
each policy issue.
Finally, the amount of resources allocated to policy i is
Pi,t = pi,tB 12
This component of the policy-making process indicates
that the government’s behavior is adaptive. That is, resources
are redistributed when undesired events such as the detection
of corruption materialize.
4.4. Algorithm. Once the political economy game is formu-
lated mathematically, an agent-based model is programmed
with Algorithm 1. Note that, for each simulation, four endog-
enous variables are obtained: public servants’ contributions
and beneﬁts, government’s allocations, and society’s develop-
ment indicators. A simulation halts when a convergence cri-
terion is met for all indicators. The combination of a
coevolutionary learning process, the diversity of conditions
that bureaucrats face, and the network of policy spillovers
requires computational simulation.
4.5. Estimation of Allocation Proﬁles. Each country in the
data set can adopt development modes of nations with (1)
a higher GDP per capita (adjusted for purchasing power
parity) and (2) a higher average level of development indica-
tors. This means that, for the sample of 117 countries, there
are more than 6000 combinations of country-mode pairs
(e.g., RUS-CAN stands for Russia adopting the Canada
development mode). We estimate the allocation proﬁles of
each of these pairs, assuming no policy disruptions. For a
given pair, a single allocation proﬁle consists of the inter-
temporal averages P = 1/ℓ∑ℓt=0Pi,t
N
i=1, where ℓ is the num-
ber of periods before converging to the targets. For the
same pair, we performmMonte Carlo simulations and com-
pute the average allocation proﬁle P = 1/M∑Mm=1Pmi
N
i=1.
Each simulation is calibrated by imputing the empirical
values of the country’s development indicators in 2016
(the initial conditions), the estimated network of spill-
overs, the values of the adopted mode’s development indi-
cators in 2016 (the targets), and the budget constrain B
obtained from an indicator on public expenditure as a
fraction of GDP.
In order to provide inference on aggregate metrics, we
calibrate parameter γ to ﬁt our endogenous variable of
corruption (Pi − Ci) to the observed levels of an empirical
indicator on the diversion of public funds. This is done
through a clustering algorithm that classiﬁes all countries
into diﬀerent categories of γ (see details in [6]). Once
the model has been calibrated, we obtain the average allo-
cation proﬁle for a set of Monte Carlo simulations. The
purpose of estimating these proﬁles is to obtain the relative
priorities that governments give to diﬀerent policies under
5Complexity
each development mode, which we use in this paper to
identify bottlenecks.
For illustration purposes, Figure 2 presents the estimated
policy proﬁles for three diﬀerent country-mode pairs. From
this example, we infer that policy priorities depend on the
speciﬁc pair, which highlights the relevance of context in
the design and implementation of policies. Likewise, we can
conclude that the coherence of the allocation proﬁle, and
not the strength of isolated policies, is what really matters
to achieve development goals.
4.6. Estimation of Resilience. The strategy to assess the resil-
ience of an individual policy is to measure the eﬀect of dis-
rupting its budgetary allocation. This exercise describes a
scenario where the central authority of a country is forced
to put oﬀ the implementation of a transformative policy
due to an unexpected event. In the context of our behavioral
game, the disruption of a transformative policy in issue i pre-
cludes it from receiving sustained allocations. Aware of this
disruption, the government adapts and modiﬁes its policy
priorities in an attempt to reach the targets speciﬁed by the
chosen development mode. In other words, this “change of
plans” alters the coevolutionary learning process between
central authority and functionaries, and, hence, the dynamics
through which the indicators reach all their targets. More for-
mally, assume that policy i has been disrupted (Pi,t = 0 for all
t). Let T ij denote the time it takes for indicator j to converge
to its target while i has been disrupted. Then, the adjusted
convergence time induced by a disruption of i is
T i = Ti − Ii,0
N − 1 〠
N−1
j≠i
T ij, 13
where Ti − Ii,0 takes into account the fact that, by disrupting
an indicator with a large initial gap, the average convergence
time becomes shorter. The fact that a policy issue is not
receiving direct investments does not inhibit the possibility
that the level of its associated indicator can increase. On the
contrary, this is likely to happen because there are spillover
eﬀects among policies.
As we previously discussed, resilience is a dynamic prop-
erty of a system. This means that the eﬀect of disrupting a
particular public policy needs to be measured beyond the
budgetary consequences of setting Pi,t = 0. In other words, a
policy is said to be resilient if the corresponding adjusted
convergence time is lower than the expectation from remov-
ing direct investments from i. In contrast, the policy is said to
be fragile if its adjusted convergence time is higher. (A direct
comparison of convergence times between the complete and
the disrupted models is not informative. This is so because it
is not possible to isolate the eﬀect of the disrupted policy due
to the adaptive nature of the model. That is, the complete
model has N objectives and the disrupted has N-1, rendering
any comparison useless without a normalization that
accounts for the eﬀect of the disrupted policy.)
Our proxy to measure the direct budgetary eﬀects on
convergence time is Pi, the average allocation to policy issue
i obtained from the model without disruptions. Note that, by
(11), Pi and Ti − Ii,0 are positively correlated. Therefore, if the
model was purely driven by budgetary eﬀects, a relationship
between Pi and T
i would be almost perfect (although not
necessarily linear). Deviations from the expectation of such
relationship denote evidence of resilience and fragility. Allow
us to illustrate this with a hypothetical example. Figure 3
shows artiﬁcial data about the positive relationship between
T i and Pi. The solid line represents the estimated relation-
ship, i.e., the expected budgetary eﬀect on the adjusted con-
vergence time. The dots above the conﬁdence interval
denote fragile policy issues because their disruption increase
convergence time more than expected. The dots under the
interval correspond to resilient policies. Finally, the policy
issues inside the interval are undeﬁned because they are
explained by the budgetary eﬀect.
Figure 3 exempliﬁes the importance of a systemic
approach to public policy. The points away from the expecta-
tion capture the eﬀects derived from the coevolutionary
dynamics of the model and the network. Given that each
country can choose between multiple development modes
and that it has a unique combination of network topology,
initial conditions, and institutional factors, the relationship
to be estimated for each country is
T̂
i = aPbi + εi, 14
where a and b are the parameters to be estimated via nonlin-
ear least squares. Then, we construct our resilience score of
policy i as follows
ℛi =
T̂
i
l −T
i if T i < T̂ il ,
T̂
i
u −T
i if T i < T̂ iu,
0 otherwise,
15
where T̂
i
l and T̂
i
u denote the lower and upper bounds of the
estimated conﬁdence interval. For clarity in the exposition of
our results, the positive value of this score indicates that the
corresponding policy is resilient (below the curve), while
the negative value denotes that the policy is fragile (above
the curve).
Input: A, T , B, γ
1 for each time t do
2 for each public servant i do
3 update contribution Ci,t ;
4 update beneﬁts Fi,t ;
5 for each node i do
6 update indicator Ii,t ;
7 for each node i do
8 central authority updates Pi,t ;
9 if ∣Ii,t − Ii,t−1∣ < ϵ for every i then
10 halt;
Algorithm 1: Computation implementation.
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5. Results
We estimate the 79 disrupted allocation proﬁles of each
country-mode pair (for each of the 79 cases of disruption in
a country-mode pair, we performed 30 Monte Carlo simula-
tions). For an individual country x, we pool all the outputs
from simulating the adoption of all the development modes
that x can follow. Then, we ﬁt the curve in (14) to these out-
puts. Although we do not display conﬁdence intervals in our
plots (due to their narrowness), all our results were calculated
considering an interval of 95% conﬁdence. This curve pro-
vides the expected adjusted convergence time when x cuts
its budget allocation to a disrupted policy with certain level
of priority. When the convergence time from disrupting a
policy deviates signiﬁcantly from this expectation, it suggests
resilience or fragility.
First, we provide an aggregate example in Figure 4 by ﬁt-
ting (14) to the pooled outputs of all the country-mode pairs.
(The time variable in the vertical axis is normalized by the
sum of adjusted convergence times of all perturbations in
the proﬁle, while the priorities in the horizontal axis are nor-
malized by the country’s budget B.) This aggregate exercise is
useful to show the general structure of convergence times and
relative priorities. Note that the simulated points produce a
nonlinear ﬁt, so resilient policies are those below the curve,
while fragile ones lie above it. Many policies exhibit low rela-
tive priorities and short convergence times when disrupted.
On the other hand, fewer have large budgetary allocations
while, at the same time, produce long convergence times.
The inset panel shows the distribution of deviations from
the curve. This shows that most of the points are well
explained by budgetary eﬀects.
5.1. The Importance of Spillovers. Our next aggregate result
highlights the importance of spillover eﬀects on the simula-
tion outcomes. Network eﬀects on node-level dynamic were
already identiﬁed by [6], who showed that more incoming
spillovers induce lower contributions. Then, in the context
of resilience, a straightforward demonstration of these eﬀects
is through the adjusted convergence time when the allocation
on issue i is disrupted. Figure 5 shows this metric aggregated
by countries (Figure 5(a)) and by indicators (Figure 5(b)).
That is, the dots represent average values across simulation
runs and development modes for all indicators and for all
countries, respectively. In each panel, the estimates have been
obtained from the full model, incorporating spillover eﬀects,
and from an incomplete version where we deactivate all
interactions among policy issues.
Figure 5(a) shows that the simulations generate signiﬁ-
cantly diﬀerent convergence times for most countries when
we remove spillovers. Notice that, in most cases, the adjusted
convergence time is lower when countries have spillover
eﬀects. This indicates that network eﬀects tend to be
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Figure 2: Average allocation proﬁles of three country cases.
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beneﬁcial for reaching development goals, independently of
disrupted public policies. In some cases, however, this does
not occur due to diﬀerent mechanisms. In our view, an intu-
itive explanation for an increase in convergence time due to
spillover eﬀects has to do with the reallocation of resources.
For example, it is possible that—for some countries and
development modes—redistributing resources from a dis-
rupted issue to other policies generates biases in favor of
nodes with relatively fewer outgoing spillovers. Under these
circumstances, it may seem as if the presence of spillovers is
detrimental for reaching the targets. Interestingly, we ﬁnd
that these cases tend to be advanced nations, suggesting that
spillover eﬀects are more beneﬁcial (at least in a more direct
way) in developing countries. Of course, second order
eﬀects might also contribute to this phenomenon.
In Figure 5(b), we can see that, by removing the spill-
overs, the adjusted convergence time varies modestly
between indicators. This is expected since, in the absence
of a network, indicators evolve only through the contribu-
tions of their bureaucrats. In this case, most of the empiri-
cal variation comes from the diﬀerent budget constraints
across countries. Since indicator-level aggregations include
all countries, this variation is not observed across indica-
tors. Therefore, spillovers provide an important source of
heterogeneity to study resilience at the aggregate level of
each indicator.
5.2. Simulation Results for Three Countries. Out of the 117
countries in the data set, we select three to estimate (14).
These countries are in signiﬁcantly diﬀerent stages of devel-
opment, for example, Mexico is considered a high-middle
income country (cluster 2), Albania is lower-middle (cluster
3), and Nigeria is low (cluster 4).
Figure 6 shows the pooled outputs of all the country-
mode pairs for each of the three cases. To be more precise,
each dot in Figure 6(a) corresponds to T i and Pi when i is
disrupted in a speciﬁc development mode that Mexico can
adopt. That is, there are 79 dots for each development mode.
Here, we highlight the dots corresponding to the most
resilient development mode (in blue) and to the least one
(in orange). The resilience of a country-mode pair is mea-
sured through the average resilience score from its 79 dis-
rupted policies. High resilience at the level of an allocation
proﬁle does not imply that all policies are resilient. It means
that a country adopting a particular development mode has
better chances at reaching its targets below the expected time.
Figure 7 shows the outcome of a similar exercise, this
time, highlighting the indicators with the highest and the
lowest average resilience scores across development modes.
The blue (orange) dots highlight the most (least) resilient
indicator across diﬀerent development modes. In the Mexi-
can case, the most fragile issue falls into the pillar of public
governance, while the most resilient belongs to the pillar of
cost of doing business. For Albania, the most resilient indica-
tor corresponds to the R&D innovation pillar and the most
fragile to the ﬁnancial market development pillar. In the case
of Nigeria, the most fragile issue relates to the pillar of infra-
structure while the most resilient is part of the health pillar.
These ﬁndings illustrate two important facts: (i) a disaggre-
gated analysis is very important because some policy issues
within a development mode can be very resilient while others
can be extremely fragile, and (ii) a particular policy issue can
be highly resilient (or fragile) for a country, no matter which
development mode is adopted.
Finally, Figure 8(a)–8(c) show which ones are the most
and the least resilient development pillars. The resilience of
a pillar measures the average score of its corresponding indi-
cators (or policy issues) across all development modes adopt-
able by a country. For the Mexican case, public governance is
the most fragile pillar while infrastructure is the most resil-
ient. Interestingly, the most resilient (fragile) pillar contains
indicators that are rather fragile (resilient), highlighting
the importance of disaggregation. This also occurs in the
other two cases but with diﬀerent pillars. For Albania, the
most fragile pillar is health, and the most resilient is R&D
innovation. This picture is completely reversed for Nigeria.
This is an interesting result since, intuitively, one would
expect health to be fragile. The Nigerian case is special
because the eﬀect on convergence time is largely dominated
by the gap between initial conditions and targets. In fact,
Nigeria exhibits a disproportionate indicator-target gap of
its health-related indicators, which makes it a high-priority
pillar (due to (11)), as shown in Figure 2. In contrast, for
example, Mexico’s top pillar—public governance—is the
most fragile. This highlights the importance of context spec-
iﬁcity and the interactions between initial conditions, tar-
gets, and spillovers.
5.3. A Global View of Resilience. In this section, we provide a
global perspective of resilience by computing average scores
at the level of development pillars and indicators. The pur-
pose of this section is to understand how, across all the coun-
tries in the sample, certain policy issues tend to be fragile or
resilient. These global averages are obtained from all the
country-mode estimations. In other words, these results
should be interpreted as the level of resilience that we should
expect if we were to study a policy issue in a hypothetical
country with the average characteristics of the population.
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Figure 9 shows the average resilience scores at the level
of development pillars. The top three most resilient pillars
are governance of ﬁrms, technological readiness, and cost of
doing business. In contrast, the three most fragile pillars
(negative resilience scores) are infrastructure, macroeco-
nomic environment, and business sophistication. Note that,
due to the dominance of laggard economies in the country
population, these estimates are biased towards developing
countries. Nevertheless, if we pick a country at random,
these are the expected levels of resilience to be found in each
development pillar.
Figure 10 presents the average resilience scores at the
level of each development indicator. Once more, the bar dia-
gram highlights the importance of a disaggregated analysis.
For instance, Figure 9 indicates that themacroeconomic envi-
ronment pillar is rather fragile, yet in Figure 10, we can see
that the inﬂation indicator is resilient. This is particularly
interesting given the generalized notion that controlling
inﬂation is central for economic development. This result,
in contrast, suggests that this policy issue is not critical to
attain the rest of the development goals. This is coherent with
the idea of incorporating more diverse development goals in
the international agenda. For example, one of the drivers
behind the Sustainable Development Goals has been a critical
position towards the narrow scope of the Millennium Devel-
opment Project, which focused almost exclusively in eco-
nomic outcomes. In fact, most development pillars have at
least one indicator with the opposite classiﬁcation (resilient/
fragile). The top ﬁve most resilient indicators are time to
resolve insolvency, time required to enforce a contract, gov-
ernment procurement of advanced tech. products, survival
to age 65 (male), and adolescent fertility rate, with two of
them belonging to the pillar of cost of doing business and
two more to health. The top ﬁve most fragile indicators are
business cost of crime and violence, infant mortality rate,
tuberculosis cases, quality of port infrastructure, and quality
of roads, with two of them belonging to the health pillar
and two more to infrastructure.
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5.4. Bottlenecks and Sturdy Policy Issues. One of the key chal-
lenges in development is the identiﬁcation of policy issues
that act as binding constraints to development [21–23]. In
other words, there exist certain policy issues that act as
bottlenecks, so their identiﬁcation can make policy design
substantially more eﬀective. In our context, bottlenecks are
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fragile policy issues that receive a low relative priority by the
central authority. Put it diﬀerently, these are policies where
the central authority does not invest large sums, and, ironi-
cally, their disruption lowers the chances of attaining the
goals of a chosen development mode.
Another important concept is sturdiness. We say that a
policy issue is sturdy when it is a prime objective of the
central authority, and, nonetheless, it is very resilient to dis-
ruptions. This paradoxical scenario is explained by two
important features of the policy-making process. On the
one hand, the adaptability of the agents involved in the
design and implementation of policies (governments and
public functionaries) allows a proper reallocation of
resources from the original priorities to alternative policies
which, in turn, mitigate negative impacts. On the other hand,
the network of interdependent policies helps to improve the
performance of an indicator even if it does not receive direct
contributions from the general budget.
In order to identify bottlenecks and sturdy policies, we
isolate those points that fall in the 5th and 95th percentiles
of relative priorities. Bottlenecks are fragile policies in the
5th percentile, while sturdy ones are resilient issues in the
95th. Once isolated, we calculate the overall score of the bot-
tlenecks (which is negative) and sturdy policies (positive) at
the levels of pillars and development indicators. The overall
score consists of summing the indicator-level scores. The rea-
son for a sum, and not an average, is that the sum takes into
account the frequency with which a policy appears in bottle-
neck or sturdy issues across all country-mode pairs. Figure 11
shows the overall scores of bottlenecks and sturdy policies in
each development pillar.
The ﬁrst thing to notice in Figure 11 is the large diﬀerence
in the number of cases between bottlenecks and sturdy poli-
cies, being the latter much more frequent. This pattern
emerges from the learning and adaptive behavior of the
agents. It means that the adaptive nature of the policy-
making process reduces the number of scenarios where
adverse events hinder economic development. The second
feature is that the sturdiest indicators belong to the pillars
of business sophistication, ﬁnancial market development,
and governance of ﬁrms. On the other hand, the most critical
bottlenecks belong to the pillars of business sophistication,
public governance, health, and infrastructure.
Figure 12 presents a similar visualization, disaggregated
by development indicators. Here, the sturdiest policy issues
are control of international distribution, venture capital avail-
ability, ﬁnancing through local equity market, buyer sophisti-
cation, and ethical behavior of ﬁrms. In contrast, the most
critical bottlenecks are production process sophistication,
value chain breadth, extent of staﬀ training, university-indus-
try collaboration, and business impact of HIV/AIDS. The rea-
son why an indicator can be sturdy and a bottleneck at the
same time is that resilience scores may be diﬀer signiﬁcantly
between country-mode pairs. Figure 13 in the appendix pre-
sents another visualization at the level of the development
pillars but disaggregated into countries.
6. Conclusions
The quantitative study of prioritization and resilience of
public policies demands a systemic approach in order to
provide rigorous guidelines for policy advice. Traditional
methods such as regression analyses, growth diagnostics,
and benchmarking are severely limited for this purpose
because they neglect the fundamental systemic qualities
of any economy. These include the interdependencies
between policies, the importance of societal context (i.e.,
initial conditions, structure, and development modes to
pursue), the multiobjective goal-seeking behavior of gov-
ernments, and political economy considerations that pro-
duce misaligned incentives. In this paper, we develop a
complexity approach that overcomes these limitations
and use it to understand the phenomenon of resilience in
public policy.
Our framework allows identifying the allocation proﬁles
that an adaptive government selects—through a behavioral
game—in an attempt to reach the multiple targets of a pre-
speciﬁed development mode. These proﬁles are established
in an environment where public functionaries in charge of
implementing policies learn how to divert public funds.
Thus, by modelling the policy-making process, our method-
ology is capable of analyzing the adaptive nature of resilience
in policy issues when facing adverse events.
By disturbing the resource allocation to speciﬁc policy
issues, we obtain multiple results that help us to understand
policy resilience. First, some policy issues are resilient (i.e.,
the development goals are reached earlier than expected)
while others are fragile. Second, context matters because the
level of resilience or fragility depends on the country’s initial
conditions and the adopted development mode. Third, for
speciﬁc countries, some policy issues prove to be resilient
across development modes. Fourth, although some develop-
ment pillars tend to be resilient for speciﬁc countries, it is
common to ﬁnd that at least one of its indicators is fragile.
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Fifth, there is a set of sturdy policy issues that combine high
levels of resilience with large budget allocations. In contrast,
fragile policies with low budgetary priority are identiﬁed as
the bottlenecks to development.Overall, there aremore sturdy
policies than bottlenecks. However, the latter should raise
some ﬂags in the development strategies of governments,
since they represent major impairments to the economic
development of their nations.
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Country-Level Analysis
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